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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to quantify the economic effects of the
introduction of a system of tradable permits in the European Union (EU). For
this purpose we use linked applied general equilibrium models (AGE) for
eleven EU member countries. This method enables us to measure the change
in competitiveness for domestic industries, the impact on growth, employment
and inflation in member countries, and the cost and benefits of a cooperative
approach to adhere to a EU target ofemissions of air pollutants. The results we
will present are first results from the SOLVGE/GEM-E3 Projekt. GEM-E3
stands for General Equilibrium Modeling for Energy - Economy - Environment,
a joint undertaking of NTUA-Athens (P. Capros, P. Georgakopoulos), CES-
KULeuven (S. Proost and D. Van Regemorter), Univ. Mannheim and ZEW (K.
Conrad and T. Schmidt), GEMME-CEA (N. Ladoux), Univ. Strathclyde (P.
MacGregor), CORE-UCL (Y. Smeers),
With respect to a policy on greenhouse gases we will quantify the
economic impact for the, EU by introducing a EU-wide tradable permit system,
free ofcharge and based on the present energy intensity and energy mix. Under
growth there will be a positive market price for permits with demand by
countries where the cost of substitution are high and supply by those countries
where the cost of substitution are low. We will measure economic performance
and trade flows under a noncoordinated CO2 policy where each country limits
the emission of CO2 by 10% and will compare the result with a cooperative
outcome where the European Union as a decision maker aims at reducing CO2
by 10%.1. Introduction
Preventive measures to protect the earth's atmosphere and the associated
policies required are at the centre of international conventions concerning the
environment. A large number of states have decided or are beginning to decide
in favour of a drastic reduction of energy-related carbon dioxide (C02) and
sulfur dioxide (S02) emissions. The greenhouse gas CO2 results from the
combustion of fossil carbon, so that a reduction of CO2 emissions can only be
achieved by reducing the use of fossil energy carriers. These sources of energy,
however, are the backbone of current energy supply. Since a reduction of CO2,
SO~ or NOx emissions cannot be achieved by technical measures alone, the use
of economic instruments such as taxes and marketable permits was also, and
still is, taken into consideration to achieve predefined emission goals. The
objective of this paper is to quantify the economic effects of the introduction of
tradable permits for CO2 in the European Union (EU). For this purpose we use
linked applied general equilibrium models (AGE) for eleven EU member
countries. This method enables us to measure the change in competitiveness for
domestic industries, the impact on growth, employment and inflation in member
countries, the cost effectiveness of a coordinated environmental policy and the
costs and benefits of a cooperative approach to adhere to a EU target of
emissions of air pollutants. The results we will present are first results from the
SOLVEGE! GEM-E3 Project. GEM-E3 stands for General Equilibrium
Modelling for Energy - Economy - Environment, a joint undertaking of NTUA-
Athens (P. Capros, P. Georgakopoulos), CES-KULeuven (S. Proost and D. Van
Regemorter), Univ. Mannheim and ZEW (K. Conrad and T. Schmidt),
GEMME-CEA (N. Ladoux), Univ. Strathclyde (P. MacGregor), CORE-UCL
(Y. Smeers). The data consist of national social accounting matrices, an exten-
sion of the social account by an input-output table and of an environmental
data base.
The specification\ of the present minimum standard model consists of unit
cost functions of the nested CES type for eleven industries. There are overall
CES functions in the KLEM (capital, labor, energy, and material) input prices
with price diminishing (factor augmenting) technical change and CES sub-cost
functions. The foreign trade specification is of the Armington type. The de-
mands for the goods are distinguished not only by types of goods (eleven) but
also by place of production (eleven EU member countries and the rest of the
world). The share parameters in the CES specification for a good i supplied byeach of the twelve countries and demanded in a country k will be calculated
using a trade matrix for each of the eleven goods.
The model of consumer behavior in each social group is based on an
extended linear expenditure system. The consumers choose the optimal alloca-
tion of expenditure for nondurables and for services of durables across 12
consumption categories and saving. Consumption matrices are used to break
down these categories into their origins (11 goods). The prices of the services
from durables are expressed in cost prices consisting of user costs and all cost
components linked to the use of the durables (e.g. a gasoline tax, a motor
vehicle tax). The interest rate takes care of the closure rule. Trade in goods and
services between countries will not be balanced by endogeneous exchange rates
but the model will present changes in the national balances of trade.
Two environmental problems will be considered: global warming and
acidification. Abatement cost functions of the main acidification components,
i.e. S02 and NOx have been estimated for several industries. These functions
depend on the degree of abatement (set as a standard by regulation or deter-
mined by the firm as an endogeneous variable) and they will increase the price
or unit cost of using emission intensive inputs. Yearly increases in real net
investment in equipment for cleaner air by industry and country will be used to
calculate degrees of abatements in the base year. Finally, from total deposition
(emissions of S02 and NOx) at a receptor due to a specific source we derive (i)
deposition at a receptor per unit emission from a source country (transport
coefficient) and (ii) the background depositions in every country.
With respect to a policy concerning the problem of greenhouse gases we
will quantify the economic impact for the ED by introducing a ED-wide trada-
ble permit system, free of charge and based on the present energy intensity and
,energy mix. If we then depreciate tradable permits by 10 percent, there will be
a positive market price for permits with demand by countries where the cost of
substitution are high and supply by those countries where the cost of substitu-
tion are low. We will look into the implications of reducing CO2 by 10% nation
by nation via a permit system versus a ED-wide reduction of 10%. Of interest
is who will gain and who will loose under a cooperative approach.
Despite the desirable pioneer role as a signal for action being required,
we expect higher prices and a loss in growth under an unilateral action taken by
one country. However, if the ED decided to introduce an emission tax or a
system of tradable permits, losses in growth might be kept, as we will investigate
in this paper, within acceptable limits.
22. The Specification ofthe Standard Version ofthe GEM-E3 Model
2.1 Cost function and input coefficients for the KLEM aggregate
We characterize the technology of a cost minimizing industry by nested CES
cost functions. C(X, PKE, PLMF) is the cost function at the first stage with
input prices for the capital/electricity aggregate KE and the labor/material/fuel
aggregate LMF. Our production function is assumed to be CES in KE and LMF
with factor-augmenting technical change. Hence there is price diminishing
technical progress in the cost function in terms of effective input prices. Figure
1 shows the nested production structure.
Figure 1
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Profit maximization under constant returns to scale implies revenue PX . X
equal to cost which explains the output price PX of domestic production in
terms of a CES unit cost function:
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In principle, one could include all the input prices of the model in one CES unit
cost function. This, however, would imply the assumption, that the elasticity of
substitution between all inputs is the same. We therefore specify sub-cost
functions for the capital/electricity aggregate and for the LMF-aggregate with
different elasticities of substitution. The price function for the KE aggregate at
that second level is:
(4)
I
PKE = [d PK
1-OKE + d PEI-OKE] I-O KE
IK IE
with PE = PE / gE (t), expressing electrictiy augmenting (price diminishing)




In order to determine the capital input c~efficient, one has to multiply (5) by
(2):
(7) a = K = ~ (.) • KE (.)
K X KE X
Capital input as derived from (7) is the desired capital stock, say Kdes (if stocks
are proportional to service tlows). In the standard version of the GEM-E3 model
we treat, however, capital as a quasi-fix stock over the current year at a level
4from the end of the previous year, say K_1• We therefore use (7) to determine an
endogeneous ex-post price ofcapital based on a rate of return which the industry
has earned ex-post. For that purpose we solve (7) for P~ost:
P~SI is the endogeneous shadow price of capital which clears the market for
fixed K 1• It will be used to calculate capital income P~st . K_1 in period 1. It is




If we determine an exogeneous ex ante price of capital PKante, then (7) can be
employed to determine the desired stock of capital ~es' Let this ex ante price be
the standard user cost of capital formula:
PKante = PI(r + a)
where PI is the price of investment goods, r is the rate of return on risk-free
government bonds (exogeneous or determined by the closure rule) and a is the
rate of replacement. Then the desired capital stock is
(8) K = X . d . [ PKE JaKE. (ttKE-1 d . [ PX )ax (ttx-1
des lK PK gK 1 PKE gKE
ante
with PKante appearing also in PKE as specified under (4).
Net investment Inel with "adjustment" is
Finally, capital stock for the next period is
(10) K = I
br + (l - a)K_
1
where Ibr = Inel + a . K_,l.
We should finally concede that a specification of a restricted cost function C (X,
K_ t , PKE, PLMF) would have been the appropriate approach to a model with a
quasi-fixed capital stock. In such a case, however, the system of prices would
depend also on X which complicates the solution process for the linked models.
If capital is mainly machinery and electrical equipment, then capital and
1 Insert into the zero profit condition (with K( for K) the inputs E, and LMF from (3) and
(6) and solve for PK by using (1).
5electricity are used in fixed proportions. An alternative approach then would be
to define the price of capital in terms of a cost price (Conrad (1983». A higher
price ofelectricity increases the cost of using capital, which, in turn, may increase
the demand for labor. In order to model such a relation we introduce a partial
linkage of capital and electricity. In the cost function
C(KE, PK, PE) = min (PK· K + PE . E) S.t. KE = f(K, E)
K,E
we partition E by E = (lE • K + E where (lE • K is the electricity demand
derived from K and E is the flexible electricity which can be conservated if
substituted by other inputs. Inserting E in the cost definition yields:
C(KE, PK, PE) = min (PK . K + PEe (lE • K + E) S.t. KE =f(K, (lE • K + E)
K,E
or
C(KE, PK, PE) min «PK + (lE PE) K + PE . E S.t. KE = F(K, E»
K,E
where PK = PK + (lE PE is the cost price of capital. Cost prices reflect the
aspect of linked inputs and provide for a different pattern of substitution. The
demand for capital K and flexible energy E can be derived by Shephard's
Lemma.
We next have to specify a price function for the aggregate LMF:
1
PLMF = [d PI: -uL + d PMI-UL + d PF -UL]~
2L 2M 2F
The price-dependent composition of this aggregate follows again from
Shephard's Lemma:
i = L, M, F.
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Similarly, we choose a CES specification for the unit cost function for material:
[








The cost-minimizing allocation of material to its components follows from:
(12)
If we multiply the overall input coefficient by the sub-input coefficient we obtain
the input coefficients aj :
F. F. F LMF
(13) a. , --.!. (.) LMF (.) . ----x- (.), - ,
X F
M. M. M LMF (14) a , -' (.) LMF (.) (.),
I X M X
i = 1, ...,m
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The (.) indicates that the coefficients depend on relative prices.
72.2 The foreign trade specification
For modeling intra-industry foreign trade between the EU member coun-
tries, the Armington approach is widely accepted: domestically produced goods
and imports from different countries are imperfect substitutes. Thus dual to a
CES production function Ye = f(Xe, IMe), giving supply Ye in country c as an
aggregate of domestic production Xe and imports IMe, is a CES unit cost
function
I
(15) PYc= [ex. PX:-ax
+ (l - ex) PIM :-ax]~
where PYe, PXe, and PIMe are the corresponding prices of Ye, Xe, and IMe (price
of aggregated imports is in national currency of country c). From this cost
function we derive the share of domestic production in total supply:
(16) ~: = ex . [;;J
and the share of aggregate import in total supply:
(17) 1M ( PY ]a
x
_c = (1 _ ex) . _c .
Y PIM c c
If the model determines total supply, then we have to allocate aggregate import
demand, derived from (17), to the 11 EU member state countries and to the rest
of the world who contribute to this aggregate import demand. Thus import
consists, in other words, of the exports of the 12 countries in that good. Therefo-
re, in the GEM-E3 model the demands for the 11 goods are also distinguished
by place of production. There will be French import demand of consumer goods
produced in the United Kingdom and produced in Spain. To obtain such a trade
matrix with 11 x 12 import demand functions by good and place of production
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where PIMk is the price of imports as the export price by country k. As there are
8import taxes and duties (tduJ, it is PIMk = (1 + tduJ • PYk (Since we distinguish
by 11 goods, we have to write PIMi•k = (1 + ti.duJ • PY i,k for a good i and a
country k). ek•c is the exchange rate index in currency of country k per unit
currency of country c. Given the price index PIMRow and the exchange rates
eROWp the eleven prices PIMc can be calculated. This permits us to determine
next from (15) PY for a certain good and then the shares in (16) and (17).
Again, a cost minimizing composition of the import aggregate is the
objective of the importing country. Shephard's Lemma, applied to the cost
function PIMc in (18), yields this composition:
(19) k 1,...,12
where IMk,c is the import by country c from country k in currency of country c.
Because of Lk cmk = 1, the adding up condition Lk (PIMk / ek•C) • IMk•c = PIMc
. IMcis automatically satisfied. Ifwe multiply (19) by IMc, derived from equation
(17), we can fill a trade flow matrix for each of our 11 commodities. Such a
trade matrix looks as follows:
country 1 ... c ... 12 export
.. .




k -e- ·IMk,e EXk k,e
[PIM12 ] [PIMI2 ] 12 -- ·IMI2,1 -- ·IM12,12 EX 12
e 12,1 e 12.12
, ..
import PIM1'IMI " . PIMe ·IMe " . PIM I2 'IMI2 see (20)
9The column sums yield the value of import of country c in currency of country
,,- c. The quantity elements in row k, IMk,c (c = 1,...,12), are in currency of country
c. Multiplied by the exchange rate ek,c in currency of country k per unit of
currency ofcountry c, they can be sumed up to yield export EXkof country k, i.e.
(20) EXk = L ek,e • IMk.e
e
EXk in turn enters final demand in the input-output accounting system. The









In the Standard Version of the GEM-E3 model the exchange rates are exogene-
ous and the balances of trade are calculated as residuals.
2.3 Consumer demand and labor supply
Usually the behavior of consumers is assumed to perform a two-stage
budgeting procedure: an intertemporal allocation of lifetime wealth endowment
between present and future consumption of goods and leisure, and an intratem-
poral allocation of consumption into categories. The latter are then transformed
into consumption by product. Figure 2 shows the household's allocation problem.
Figure 2
Households allocation scheme
Intertemporal allocation of full conaumptlon FC
given full dlapoaable Income
I







oara heating eleotrlo 8 consumption
I aysltem ap~LII_an_oe_s ex_p_e_nt_ltu_r_e_ ~ categories
energy demand Is linked to the use of durabllll
10
eupplyof
labourFurthermore, if the distributional impacts of policies are to be assessed, a dis-
aggregation into several types of households is required. In the standard GEM-
E3 version we consider a representative consumer who is characterized by an
expenditure function for "full" expenditure which consists of expenditures for
non-durable goods and for leisure given the stocks of consumer durables. Since
environmental regulation affects the use and purchase ofconsumer durables such
as cars, electric appliances, and heating, a model of consumer behavior should
integrate demand for durables and for non-durables. Demand for non-durables
like gasoline or electricity and demand for services from durables has to be
reconciled with investment demand for modifying the stocks ofdurables towards
their optimal levels. We therefore employ a restricted expenditure function with
stocks ofdurables as quasi-fixed goods. The expenditure function is derived from
the St~ne-Geary utility function which underlies the linear expenditure system.
At the first stage the household determines an allocation of his resources
between present and future consumption by maximizing an intertemporal utility
function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint:
max Lr (1 + srr (~c In(Cr - CO) + ~u In(Ur - UO))
Cr.Ut
s.t.
WT = Lr (1 + rtr (PCr . Cr + PUr . U r )
where WT is total wealth. Ct is real private consumption, CO its subsistence
level, LJt is leisure and LJO its subsistence level, s is the subjective discount rate
and r is the nominal interest rate. An initial commitment for leisure could be
LJO = 12 hrs/day . average working days per year. The price of leisure is PLJ
= (1 - ~) . PL where tm is the marginal tax rate for labor income. Under some
assumptions (e.g. a constant expected rate of inflation) the following demand
functions for consumption and leisure can be derived:
(21) C = CO + s ~ C _1_ (Y. + PU . U - PC . CO - PU . UO)
A A PC dlSP
rr Pc + Pu
11(22) U = UO + s Pu _1_ (Y. + PU-U - PC-CO - PU-UO)
r f.l f.l PU dlSP
r Pc + Pu
The last equation is implicit in LJ and has to be solved for LJ. Leisure and labor
demand then add up to the yearly time endowment. The savings of housholds
can then be determined by
S = YdisP - PC - C.
Next we subtract from consumption expenditure the demand for durables
and the demand ofenergy associated with using the durables. This gives expendi-
ture e for non-durables. These expenditures will be allocated on the second stage
of the consumer decision problem:
n
(23) e = L Pi Ci
i=!
The expenditure function with three quasi-fixed durable goods (Z!, Z2' Z3
for cars, electric appliances, and heating, respectively) is:
where Pi = PYi (1 + t) is the market price for the good, u is the utility level, Co.i
is the minimum required quantity of good i, Zo.j is the minimum required quanti-
ty of a durable good j, and r. Pi - Co,i is "subsistence expenditure". The expenditu-
re minimizing demand for non durable goods, given utility u and the stocks of
the three durables, can be derived by partial differentiation of the expenditure
function with respect to the prices:
(25) p. [ n ) C. = C . + ----!.. e( -) - L p. - C .
I 0,1 Pi i=! I 0,1
= 1, ...,n
Desired stocks of durables and ex-post service prices of durables can be
derived in an analogous way as used for the restricted cost function approach.






12Purchases of new durables under adjustment restrictions (0 < m ~ 1) are:
j = 1,2, 3.
We finally obtain consumer expenditures PC· C on durables and on the services
of non-durables from (27):
(27)
n 3
PC . C = E p. c. + E p (Z . + r e')
i=1 I I )=1 Zj -IJ Zj
We should finally say some words to the specification of the user cost of a
durable~ pz. In principle, we could set pz equal to PI (r + a) where PI is the
price of the durable, a is the rate of replacement and r is the interest rate.
However, as some non-durable goods as gasoline, electricity, and heating are
linked to the stock of durables, we used a composition of these goods into a
linked part and into a disposable part. The idea behind such a composition is
that demand for gasoline (CG ) is linked to the use of the stock of automobiles
(Z). Or, in algebraic terms, CG = O<G.z . Z + CG where O<G,Z is yearly gasoline
consumption per unit of purchase price of the car and eGis gasoline consump-
tion from fast driving or bad maintenance of the car. This implies a cost price
pz of the services of an automobile which is the user cost of capital PI (r + a)
plus the cost of gasoline, Le. pz = PIer + a) + O<G,Z . PG' The introduction of
a tax on CO2 or NOll will therefore increase the price of gasoline, hence the cost
price of a car, and demand for new cars will decline. Under a carbon dioxide tax,
for instance, the cost price of a car is Pz = PI (r + a) + O<G,z (PG + t
C02
• eco)
where tco is the tax rate and eco is the emission coefficient for gasoline. If we
2 2
incorporate furthermore 'a property tax or motor vehicle tax rate 1:, then the user
cost of a car is
(28) Pz = PI (r (l + 1:) + a + 1:) + aG,z • PG
For guess-estimation of the parameters Co.i' ~i and Yj we make use of the proper-
2 For more detail see Conrad and Schroder (1991 b).
13ties ofa linear expenditure system, i.e. from guess-estimates of n income elastici-
ties one obtains the n parameters ~j and from guess-estimates of n direct price
elasticities one obtains the n parameters Co,i' given the~j's(and similarly for the
parameters of the durables).
2.4 Demand, supply and the closure rule
The standard system of equations for an input-output model is
(29) Y,.=r a 'X +F LJ jj j j
j=l
where Pi is final demand with Pj = Cj + CGj + Ii + IGi + EXj • Cj is private
consumption of good i, CGj and IGj are government consumption or investment,
respectively (exogeneous), and Ii is gross investment by origin.
Since our demand system determines consumption goods by categories and
our system of investment functions investment demand by destination, we requi-
re transition matrices transforming demand into deliveries from the industries.
Therefore, the Cj's in final demand have to be seen as the result of the transition
matrix of the type (branches x categories) multiplied by the consumption catego-
ries. Similarly, an investment matrix with fixed technical coefficients serves to
compute investment demand by origin (products) from investment demand by
destination (branches) as evaluated from investment behavior in (7), together
with investment for replacement and decay, Le. () . K_t • The system (21) can be
written as a system in the unknown variables Yj if we rewrite it as
(30) y. = ~ a.. . (X
j
] • Y. + F , LJ IJ Y J 1
j=l j
with Xj / Yj determined by (16).
In value terms, demand has to be equal to supply:
(31) PZi ' Yj =L PY
j
• Xij + (1 + t) . PYj • (F j - EX) + PYj • EX,.
j=t
where PZj is the market price including indirect taxes and tj is the indirect tax






• Xi} + PL j • Lj + PIS . K_ 1J + PIMj • IMj
i=1
If we sum (31) over i and (32) over j and then substract (32) !rom (31) we obtain
the national accounting identity saying that the private gross domestic production
from both the flow of cost approach and from the flow of product approach




j + PIS . K_
1
) = L PYj • Fj - ~ PIM
j ·IM j
]
However, as we have determined already all variables in this accounting identity
(endogenously or exogenously (government expenditure and K_1), there is no
reas~n why this identity should have been satisfied.
We use the rate of return r, which influences the user cost of capital PK,.nte
= PI(r + [), as our closure variable. The left hand side of (33) is increasing in
r because of higher cost of capital. The right hand side of (33) is decreasing in
r because investment as a component of final demand F is falling in r (see (9».
Hence we expect an interest rate which closes the model.
3. The environmental module in GEM-E3
The scope of the environmental issue is limited to three pollutants: nitroo-
xides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (S02) and carbon dioxide (C02), For S02 and NOx
we specify abatement costs which will increase the cost price of using pollution
intensive inputs. To derive such a cost price, we start with the primal production
function approach where material input M consists of material input M 1 for
production and of material input, M2 required for complying with environmental
regulation, i.e. M = ~I + M2• Let us assume that the environmentally related
input M2 is proportional to the flow of pollutants, which in turn depends on the
input of fossil fuel E, i.e. M2 = a. . e . E, where e is an emission or waste coeffi-
cient in terms of tons of an air pollutant per unit of the energy input. The
parameter a. > 0 we assume to be constant for the moment; i.e. it does not
depend on the intensity of regulation. Combining the two equations yields: M =
M1 + a. . e . E. Using this composition we will rewrite the standard cost minimi-
zation approach which is:
15'~~ C(X, PK, PL, PE, PM) min {PK' K + PL . L + PM . M
K.L.E.M
+ PE . E S.t. X = f(K, L, E, M)}.
We replace M by M] + a . e . E and obtain
C(X, PK, PL, PE, PM) min {PK' K + PL . L + PM . M
1 + PE . E
K.L.E.M
S.t. X = f(K, L, E, M, + a E>}
where PE = PE + PM . a . e is the cost price of energy. It consists of the
energy price and the agditional costs due to environmental regulation when
using one unit of energy input. As the cost of regulation increases with the
enforcement intensity, a should not be a constant but should depend on the
degree of abatement. We therefore specify a as a function in the degree of
abatement a, which represents the enforcement in pollution control:
a = c(a) . a
The degree of abatement is defined as the ratio of abated emISSIon over potenti-
al emissions (0 ~ a ~ 1) and c(a) are the costs of abatement measures per unit
of emission or waste, measured in base year prices. They depend on the degree
of abatement with c'(a) > 0 and c"(a) > O. Finally, e is an emission or waste
coefficient in terms of tons ofan air pollutant per unit of energy input. With this
interpretation of a we obtain the following cost price for energy
(34) PE = PE + PM . a . e = PE + PM . c(a) . a . e.
This cost price of energy increases over-proportional with an enforcement in
environmental regulation. On the produ~tion side this implies an increasing
share of complementary material inputs. the change of the cost price of energy
will also cause the firm to alter its input choices. A stricter environmental policy
will have a substitution effect which will result in a reduced demand for energy
and its price complements and in an increased use of its substitutes. This integra-
tion of abatement costs in a cost-price concept will be used for modeling the
impact of regulation on household and firm behavior; for the latter each sector
will be treated separately.
The cost price approach can be extended for the case of several pollutants.
16Then PE is
with abatement costs for S02 and for NOx-
If there is a tax on a pollutant, then there is also a cost price component for the
actual emissions, i.e.
(36) PE = PE + PM . c (a) . a . e + t (1 - a) . e .
Finally, if there is an energy tax (tE) and / or an emission tax on carbon dioxide,
teo, where no convenient end-of-pipe measures exist, then the cost price is
Our approach permits to model the effect of alternative environmental policies.
If there is a regulated degree of abatement, then users of furnaces have to
adhere to limits of emissions which can be interpreted in terms of our model as
a minimum degree of abatement a. Then the deg~ee of abatement is given and
abatement costs increase the price of energy_If a tax on emission is introduced,
the degree a is a decision variable of the firm. Its problem is
min C (X, PK, PL, PE, PM)
The first order condition is
[: ~)[a/;)= 0
with PE as specified in,(37). Differentiating (37) with respect to a yields the cost
minimizing degree of abatement
(38) PM (c / (a) . a + c (a» - t = 0
i.e. marginal cost of abatement is equal to the tax rate.
Furthermore, future environmental regulations can be accounted for by
modifying the emission coefficients for appropriate sectors. For instance, as new
cars are equipped with catalytic converters, the emission of NOx for a given
amount of gasoline will fall gradually in the 1990's.
17The cost price approach can be embeded in the CES price function by
replacing in PE in (9) the prices of the energy components by their PE i 's.This
also increases the overall price index of energy, PE. Environmental regulation
will then have an impact on the composition of the energy aggregate E according
to (10). It will also increase the price of the product according to (1), and it will
reduce the demand for energy according to (4). When an environmental tax is
imposed it is paid to the government by the branch causing the pollution. This
has the following implications for modeling the energy price:
the price of energy, inclusive abatement cost and taxes, affects firm's deci-
sion on the input structure (at the energy level and implicitly at the ag-
gregate KLEM level); it re-presents the user's cost of energy.
the price of energy, exclusive taxes and abatement cost, is used to value
the deliveries of the energy sectors to the other sectors.
In the modeling of the abatement activities, investment in abatement has been
considered as an input for the firms and not as an investment. It is however a
component of final demand which increases GDP. The costs of each bra!!c!! for
all pollutants i,
have to be transformed to deliveries of goods from end-of-pipe technology
producing industries (through fixed coefficients). Then total delivery for abate-
ment by demand and supply sector is added to intermediate demand Xij' This
procedure increases the value of intermediate inputs. To satisfy the accounting
identity of the value of inputs and of the output, we have used the ex-post price
of capital as a residual. Hence the cost of abatement reduces the ex-post return
of capital.
The cost of using the environment as an'- input is incorporated into the
model of consumer behavior in a similar way as done for the modeling of firm's
behavior. One difference is the payment of environmental taxes to the govern-
ment. In case of firms, the environmental tax is paid by the branch causing the
pollution. For the household, the tax is paid by the branch delivering the pollu-
tion intensive product to the household. That is, the environmental tax is treated
like the other indirect taxes paid by households. If a household purchases elec-
tricity, it pays the price of delivery which includes the costs, electricity producers
18accrue from using coal which causes abatement costs and an emission tax. In this
case the price corresponds to the user cost of ~lectricity. If a household pur-
chases heating oil, its price includes only some abatement costs and emission
taxes paid by the oil companies. This price becomes a user's cost price for the
consumer allocation decision, if there are emission regulation for the heating
system or a CO2 tax.
We stilI have to solve the problem of how to measure the degree a of
abatement. A measure of regulation could be pollution abatement expenditures,
compliance status, enforcement activity or emissions. We measure regulation by
calculating a degree of abatement using pollution abatement expenditure. We
accumulate pollution abatement capital expenditure and operating costs to a
capital stock series. Pollution abatement capital expenditures is around 5 percent
of tot~1 capital expenditure in manufacturi,ng during the mid-1970s, increases to
around 6.4 percent in the mid-1980ies, and even more in-the late 1980ies. We
adjust the capital stock figures downwards by subtracting pollution abatement
capital expenditures from the gross investment series for the industries. Pollution
abatement operating costs rise steadily through the period, doubling as a share
of total manufacturing material inputs from 0.2 percent to 0.4 percent. The
pattern for our industries is similar but at a higher level. Operating costs are bet-
ween 0.3 and 1.9percent of the value of material (lowest for textiles, highest for
cellulose).





where KAt is the real net capital stock of pollution abatement expenditures. KAo
is the bench mark for the first]ear (1975), KAT is the stock of the last year
(1992) and y is a parameter between 0 and 1. The stock of pollution abatement
expenditures is calculated by
(41) KAt = KAt_I + fA t - () KAt_ 1
where IAt is real abatement costs and () is the rate of replacement (e.g. () = 0.1).
If for an industry or for manufacturing IAt is published in a statistical yearbook,
KA r can be calculated.
Formula (40) has the property that there will be no enforcement in envi-
19ronmental policy if IAl = aKAl_l . If real expenditure replaces only scrapped
equipment, then the degree. aCt) does not change. If net expenditure is positive,
aCt) will increase. The accumulation of (40) implies
(42)
T T
L aa Y L KA = (KA- )=y
KA - KA ((-1'
(=1 a t T 0 (=1
Since aCT) - a(O) = y, we interprete y to be the degree of abatement in the final
year, by assuming a(O) = 0 in 1975, the first year in our data set. If a(O) is
known, then (42) becomes
T
~ aa aCT) = a(O) + LJ -
1=\ at
For Germany the source for determining y in (40) was the law
3 from 1983 which
sets ambient air quality standards for air pollution. In this clean air act new
machinery burning fossil fuel had to comply with a standard of y ~ -0.7 for S02'
This degree of abatement is mendatory for all (new and old) fossil fuel burning
equipment by 1993. Hence it is y = aCT) = 0.7 in 1992. The degree of abate-
ment, calculated according to (42) shows the reluctance of retrofitting old
burning equipment to the standard.
Feasibility and costs of the installation of end-of-pipe abatement measures
depend on the pollutant and on the underlying production technology. Based on
data collected by Friedrich (1990), it was possible to estimate abatement cost
functions for S02 and NOx disaggregated into 11 industries and into one house-
hold group. As expressed by (39) we assume constant returns to scale in abated
emissions a-e·E for a firm's aggregated abatement technology but assume that
costs per unit of abated emissions are convex in the degree of abatement. The
marginal abatement cost function has been specified as
(43) c/(a) = ~(1 - a)V, ~ > 0, Y < O.
Integrating this function gives the unit cost function. The parameters ~ and y
have been estimated using yearly data for c'(a) and a.
c(a) =~ (l - a)Y+\ + k.
1 + y
3 Bundesimissionsschutzgesetz (BIM SCH G)
20~s we have observations for c(a) for a certain a(t), we can calibrate the con-
stant
4 k. We find that marginal abatement cost curves are fairly flat over the
range of lower degree of abatement, but eventually begin to rise steeply as the
degree becomes increasingly higher. This is in line with findings by Oates et. al.
(1989) who estimated marginal abatement cost curves for controlling air pollu-
tion. Appendix 1 shows the marginal cost functions for the electricity sector.
After evaluating the abated, and actual emissions the model computes the '
deposition of the pollutants per country and the resulting damage. The model-
ling of transboundary air pollution is linearized by using transport matrices. The
deposition a country k receives from own and foreign activities is then
(44) DP = ~ t . EM + Dpo p,k L..J p,c,k p,C p,k
C
where EMp,c are the total emissions of pollutant p in country c, ~,c,k is the trans-
port-coefficient form country c to country k and DP~,k is the background
deposition.
For the calculation ofdamages five damage categories are distinguished (namely:
acidification impacts on public health, acidification impacts on forests, acidifica-
tion impacts on lakes, acidification impacts on materials and global warming
impacts). The damage in a category is linked to the level of deposition and the
level of total emissions. Damages in forestry, for instance, are mainly linked to
the deposition of S02 and NOx while damages in public health are linked to the
ambient concentration of S02' which is usually close to the source of emission.
Hence, these damages are assumed to be proportional to the emissions. The
global warming effect of greenhouse gases like CO2 is combined with the am-
bient concentration as well. There is no deposition of CO2 , Total damages of
category I in country k are then
(45) L <Pk,I,P· DPp,k + L <pup·' EMp,c
p c,p
where <Pk,l,p and <Pk,l.p are damage coefficients which were drawn from the litera-
ture.
4 The calculations for chemicals are given in Appendix 3.
214. Tradable CO2 emission permits within branches and / or ED member
states
According to a system of tradable CO2 permits, an environmental agency
of a country or of the ED defines desired CO2 emission volumes for a sequence
of years and issues emission permits. We assume that CO2 permits are first
distributed free of charge on the basis'of the industry's (or country's) base year
emissions. Then we assume that the CO2 emissions of the base year have to be
reduced by 10% in that year. Thus there will be a demand for permits with a
positive price for them. Depending on the cost of substitution and avoidance,
and on the level and differences in growth rates, some branches (countries) will
purchase permits and some will offer them for sale. Since no retention techno-
logies are available for CO2 at reasonable costs, the cost of disposal corresponds
to that of substitution in changing from the old least cost approach to a new
solution involving higher costs of production. The advantage of a system of
tradeable permits is that cost effectiveness is achieved, i.e. the marginal cost of
substitution and avoidance incurred by the polluters is harmonized within firms,
branches of industry and regions. The optimum procedure is to avoid emissions
as long as the marginal cost of reduction is lower than the price of a permit. The
amount of CO2 produced by a firm or country can be relatively easy determined
in view of the constant ratio between the carbon content of fossil fuels and the
CO2 emissions produced during their combustion. A basis for assessment is
obtained by multiplying the amounts of coal, oil and natural gas by their respec-
tive emission coefficients (converted into tonnes of CO2 per real fuel input in
million DM). The fuel input prices will then increase by p . ej , p being the
permit price and ej the emission coefficients for coal (i= 1), oil (i = 2) and gas
(i=3).
When introducing permits free of charge and then choosing a desired level
of CO2 which is 10 percent below the base year case, two offsetting sales and
purchase effects occur. Our figure which is based on a 20% reduction of CO2,
shows the net result of a trade in permits. MACj (E) are the marginal abatement
costs (or cost of substitution and avoidance in case of CO2) for an industry i or
a country i, i = 1, 2. MAC has nothing to do with the abatement cost function
c(a) . a, given in section 3. MAC reflects the allocative losses in terms of sub-
stitution away from the former minimal cost combination. MAC(E) is the ag-
gregate marginal abatement cost function with E = E, + E2•
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Fig, Distribution oftradable permits free ofcharge to firm 1 (E)P) and finn 2 (El) with an depreciation by 20 percent thereafterhave been confronted with different standards. Each firm then holds tradable
permits equivalent to Er Adding E 1
P + E/ gives E
P
• Immediately after the issue
of permits they are depreciated by 20 percent. In the figure the dotted lines refer
to the costless issue of permits. Without a restrictive carbon policy, firm 2 would
reduce its effort to avoid CO2 emissions whereas firm 1 would have an incentive
to avoid CO2 emissions. It could sell these permits (- al) to firm 2 (+ al). Howe-
ver, given the more restrictive CO2 policy in terms of 0.8 EP permits, the permit
price will raise to p*. Due to the devaluation, firm 2 holds 8 instead of the
required 10 units of permits. It avoids some CO2 and buys the additionally
needed permits (+ a2) from firm 1. Firm 1 in turn holds after depreciation 6
units instead of 7.5 units of permits. But for firm 1 it is profitable to avoid a2
units and sell them to firm 2(+ a2). The optimal allocation of CO2 avoidance
requires that marginal cost of avoidance corresponds to the permit price, i.e.
MAC j elf) = p' for i = 1,2
where E i denotes the corresponding emission. At the permit price p' the market
is cleared:
A _ - P
E
1 + E
2 = E . 0.8
The net benefit of a cost-benefit calculation for industry i consists of the cost of
avoidance ACj and the cost (+) or revenue (-) resulting from the purchase or
sales of permits. This yields ACj (E) + p' [E; - 0.8 . E/]
If we would have considered the introduction of a tradable permit system for
S02 emissions, it would have been possible to calculate the welfare gain from a
transition to a permit system issued free of charge. This is so because we have
calculated abatement costs per industry, consisting of expenditure for abatement
activities and of investment in abatement measures. Hence we have marginal
abatement costs which differ across industries. A tradable permit system which
guarantees the present air quality of S02 would result in a welfare gain and in a
trade in permits.
The next step could then be one to a stricter enforcement in S02 emissions
with the effects illustrated by the figure. For CO2, however, costs of avoiding
carbon dioxide are not available. They might be zero for households and other
non-regulated industries and positive for the electricity producers. We therefore
had to assume zero, ma~ginal cost of avoiding CO2 for all industries, i.e. we start
with a situation illustrated by points on the E-axis. For the empirical results our
assumption implies that we underestimate welfare gains and overestimate welfare
losses.
We first simulated the 10 percent carbon reduction policy country by coun-
23try; i.e. countries reduce CO2 simultaneously by 10% each. The model covers:
- 11 countries (BE - Belgium, DE - Germany, DK - Denmark, FR - France,
GR - Greece, IR - Ireland, IT - Italy, N - The Netherlands, PO - Portugal,
SP - Spain and UK - United Kingdom.
- 11 products and sectors: 1 - agriculture, 2 - coal, 3 - crude oil and refined oil
products, 4 -gas, 5 - electric power, 6 - energy intensive industries, 7 -
equipment goods industries, 8 - consumer goods industries, 9 - transport,
10 - services, 11 - non-market services.
The model considers full competitive equilibrium in all markets, excluding the
labour market which is restricted by fixed labour supply and a periodically fixed
wage rate. Unemployment· is computed as residual. The exchange rate is kept
fixed ~nd the model allows for a free variation of the balance of payments.
Concerning the CO2-permits, the number of permits required for fossil fuel
differs by the type of fuel according to different emission coefficients. Hydro and
nuclear power plants therefore do not need permits.
Our measure of welfare change is based on Hicks' measure of equivalent
income variation (EV). Since we have calculated the economic effects from
introducing CO2-permits only for one year we have not employed an intertempo-
ral EV. We also have decided not to evaluate higher unemployment as leisure;
that is we kept leisure LJ and the wage rate constant. Our EV is therefore based
on the expenditure function in (24) and follows from:
It gives the change in expenditure at the base case price vector pO and durables
ZO that would be equivalent to the policy-implied change in utility. The utility
function which corresponds to our expenditure function is
, 3
U = II (C
i
- Co )lll' II (2. - 2o) Yj
i=\ ,/ i=\ } J
If EV < 0, welfare after the policy measure is lower than in the base case. The
consumer would be willing to pay the maximum amount EV at the fixed bugdet
level eO = e(pO, uO, ZO), to avoid the decline of utility from UO to u\. Similarly, if
EV > 0, the consumer would be willing to pay the maximum amount EV to see
the change in environmental pblicy implemented.
246. Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the economic impact from a ten percent CO2 reduction
under a non-coordinated environmental policy. The national models are linked
by trade flow matrices and a non-coordinated CO2 policy means that each of the
11 countries reduces carbon dioxid by exactly 10 percent.
The first column of Table 1 shows the equivalent variation in mill. ECU.
Of interest are especially the signs which turn out to be negative for all countries
except Portugal. Germany, e.g. is willing to pay at the most about 1.5 billion
ECU to see such a policy to be not implemented. This is about 0.2 percent of
nominal GDP, as presented in column 3. There is, however, one country, Portu-
gal, which has a positive EV. A Portuguese is willing to pay up to 1.5 ECU for
the higher standard of living under a CO2 reduction policy. Such a result indica-
tes that marginal costs of avoiding CO2 are rather low, the energy intensity in
some branches is high and substitution of labor for energy is a significant source
of higher income (see the one percent increase in employment for Portugal).
We next compare the proportionality between EV and GDP to have a
crude measure for the distributional impact of a Cq2 reduction policy. It reflects
the national sacrifices and approximates the marginal utility of income. This can
be seen by comparing the EVon a per capita base. The willingness to pay per
capita for not having a CO2 reduction policy is highest in Denmark and lowest
in Spain. Column 3 shows the percentage of EV in GDP as a measure of welfare
gain or loss in relation to the income situation. Although EV per capita is the
same for Italy and the Netherlands, the EV per GDP in column 3 express the
real sacrifice compared to the money measures in column 2.
The figures in column 4 are the net result of changes in the components
of the GDP calculation. For all-countries, except Germany, Greece and the UK,
we observe a growth in real GDP. To explain this outcome we first recognize
from column 7 that for the losing countries private consumption is lower under
a CO2 policy. This is obvious, of cour~e, given the formula for the EV. For the
same reason, private consumption is higher for a winning country. Furthermore,
gross domestic production is lower for all countries (column 6).
The variation in the rate of inflation (column 5) reflects the impact from
higher energy prices, from a change in the user cost of capital, and from impor-
ted inflation. If relative prices and national GDP growth rates change, the trade
flow matrices for each of the products transmit this effect. Column 8 and 10
show the change in national exports and imports. Import declines by all coun-
25tries. One reason is the reduction in fossil fuel imports due to higher energy
prices. Another one is the decline in private consumption. For all countries
imports decline by a higher percentage than exports (e.g. Belgium, Ireland, Italy,
Spain). This will have a positive net effect on the balance of trade which partly
explains the measured growth in real GDP. A lower import volume for the EU
implies a lower export volume for the rest of the world.
For most countries investment increases. The closure rule which balances
GDP from the flow of cost approach and from the flow of product account
produces a lower interest rate which stimulates investment.
The effect of the CO2 policy on employment is positive except for Greece
and the UK. There is a substitution effect away from energy to labour which is
partly offset by a negative output effect if production declines. The latter effect
is hjghest for Greece and the UK and dominates the positive substitution effect.
Column 13 finally shows an average permit price of 24 ECU per ton of
CO2 and a group of countries with a lower price (e.g. Greece and Belgium) and
a group with a higher price (e.g. Denmark and Italy). The level of the permit
price depends on country-specific emission coefficients, on the energy intensity,
on the energy mix and on the cost of avoiding CO2, i.e. the elasticities of sub-
stitution.
To summarize, the reason for the national differences in the impacts of a
CO2 policy is the different structure of the economies in terms of different
weights of the energy intensive industries, of the service sector, of the composi-
tion of exports and imports or the difference in equipment with consumer
durables. All these factors imply a different slope of the marginal cost curve of
avoiding CO2, Under our non-coordinated policy simulation the price ofa permit
differs considerably across countries. Since CO2- is a global pollutant, a cost-
efficient carbon reduction policy calls for a uniform CO2 permit price for all EC
countries. This policy will be introduced in the next section.
First, however,\ we show in Table 2 which sectors will buy permits and
which will sell them. Sectors with a negative value offer permits because energy
substitution is easier for them compared to those which demand permits. In all
countries electricity and the energy intensive industries sell permits. Less emis-
sion intensive industries like services or industries not regulated in the past like
transport or households are mostly better off if they decide to buy permits
instead of practising substitution. Since the relative price of energy increases,
demand will be restructured towards lower growth of energy intensive products
and higher growth of those industries producing less energy intensive products.
26Also for this reason energy intensive industries supply permits and growing
"''''fildustries, although less energy intensive, demand permits. However, not all of
the emission-intensive industries will sell permits. For examples, the refineries
(oil), agriculture, and transport will purchase permits because this is less expensi-
ve than the substitution of labour and of non-energy for energy (see Conrad and
Wang (1994) for similar results). For the other branches, purchases and sales
differ country by country depending on the composition of industries making up
the branch. Households buy permits but in ECU per capita their expenses are
very low. A family of 4 persons spends 22 ECU in France and 6 ECU in Spain.
Table 3 finally presents the economic impact of a tradable permit system
under a coordinated policy of reducing CO2 by 10 percent for the EU as a
whole. The uniform permit price is 23 ECU which is about the average of the
different permit pric~s obtained under a non-coordinated policy. The fact that it
is lower by 1 ECU (23 instead of 24.15) reflects already the welfare gain from a
coordinated policy. We expect a lower equivalent variation for the EU in total
(-6491 ECU versus -7268 ECU for the non-coordinated case). EV in ECU per
capita drops from -22.6 to -20.2. The sacrifice in the standard of living is lower
if the actions are coordinated. From the perspective of a single country, not all
benefit from the coordination. The EVs' in Table 3 are more negative for
Belgium, for Germany, or for the Netherlands. Countries which benefit are
Denmark, France or Great Britain. For Italy, e.g.,the EV in ECU per capita is
33 percent lower (-16.5 instead of -24.9). In principle, countries with a steeper
marginal cost of avoidance curve should be better off under a coordinated CO2
policy whereas countries with a flatter marginal cost curve should be worse off.
These are the countries which had a permit price below 24.15 ECU in Table 1.
Private consumption is now lower by 0.31 percent on the average compared to
0.34 in Table 1.
The economic variables reflect this result because the decline in production
is now higher for those countries which are worse off under a coordinated policy.
Although private consumption is now lower by only 0.31 percent on the average
compared to 0.34 in Table 1, only the consumers of countries with a former
higher permit price benefit. Those countries avoid now less than 10% of CO2
whereas the other countries avoid now more than 10% of CO2 , The revenues
from selling permits to the former high-permit price countries does not compen-
sate the consumers of the former low-permit-price countries for their higher
effort in avoiding CO2 for the EU member states. An exception is Greece which
benefits from the sale of higher priced permits to permit demanders. The rest of
27the world also benefits from the economic impact of a coordinated CO2 policy
because total ED import demand declines less under such a policy (-0.9 compa-
red to -1.01).
Table 4 shows who will be an exporter or importer of permits. Countries
with a permit price from the non-coordinated policy below the uniform price of
23 ECD are an exporter of permits. On the permit market electric utilities and
the energy intensive industries are the main supplier of permits, and households
and transportation the main demander.
We finally have simulated an unilateral CO2 reduction policy by a single
country, Germany. Compared to the 10% reduction under a non-coordinated
policy the EV expresses a willingness to pay additionally 278 mill. ECD at the
most for not having an unilateral CO2 policy. Most other countries benefit from
this policy because their EV is positive. Since the impact on domestic prices is
rather small (0.09%), the impact on exports is small too. If we compare the
results under an unilateral CO2 policy with those obtained under a coordinated
policy (Table 3), the EV is about the same. However, under that policy Germany
is reducing 11,2% and should be better off as sidepayments are provided for
under a coordination.
7. Conclusion
Any attempt to solve global pollution makes the linkage between energy
and the environment evident. National differences in environmental concern, in
affectedness, in per capita income and the free-rider situation delay a coordina-
ted action. Cooperation is much easier if there exists a good substitute for a
pollutant as in the case of FCKW. But for fossil fuel no substitute is in sight in
the near future. Our simulations have shown that there is no free lunch in having
lower CO2 emission level,S. A unilateral policy by a single country is - in econo-
mic terms - less attractive as an action by all ED member states. But the diffe-
rence in costs seems to be rather low. A common ED permit market could
reduce the loss in welfare, measured in terms of equivalent variation, by 10.7
percent. If the difference in the equivalent variation under a non-coordinated
policy and under a cooperative policy could be used as sidepayments to agree to
a cooperative CO2 policy, then countries which should obtain sidepayments as
compensation for the reduction in welfare are (in million ECD): Belgium (120),
Germany (286), Ireland (23), Netherlands (12), Spain (14). Countries which gain
28from a cooperative policy and therefore have to pay are Denmark (-185), France
(-57), Greece (-13), Italy (-478), Portugal (-2), and Great Britain (-502). The
winning countries (their total gain is 1237) have to pay to the losing countries
the amount of455 mill. ECU and the amount left is the difference in the equiva-
lent variations for the two simulations.
Our objective has been to show that the cost of a CO2 policy can be
expressed in economic magnitudes. The benefits with respect to the greenhouse
gas problem of such a policy are more difficult to estimate and should be higher
than the costs we obtained in order to justify a CO2 reduction policy. Our future
work will focus on this aspect using an integrated assessment framework.
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Table 1: The impact of tradable permits under a non-coordinated environmental policy
Scenario: 10 % reduction of carbon dioxide in each country
EV in Mill. of ECU EV in ECU per capita EV per GOP in % GOP(%) GOP deflator (%) production ("!o) priv. cons. (%)
Belgium -60 -6.05 -0.06 0.09 0.33 -0.09 -0.09
Germany -1449 -23.75 -0.20 -0.09 0.12 -0.24 -0.28
Denmark -359 -70.23 -0.55 0.06 0.20 -0.17 -0.85
France -1360 -- -24.72 -0.23 0.00 0.13 -0.15 -0.32
Greece -63 -6.39 -0.08 -0.22 -0.23 -0.33 -0.10
Ireland -62 -17.47 -0.31 0.01 0.45 -0.06 -0.42
Italy -1424 -24.92 -0.27 0.08 0.25 -0.14 -0.41
Netherlands -362 -24.97 -0.24 0.01 -0.13 ~0.13 -0.37
Portugal 16 1.56 0.06 0.44 1.49 -0.16 0.09
Spain -182 -4.71 -0.09 0.06 0.63 -0.22 -0.13
Great Britain -1963 -34.66 ~0.38 -0.10 -1.20 -0.54 -0.53
EU -7268 -22.61 -0.24 -0.02 -0.05 -0.25 -0.34
Rest of World
exports (%) invest. firms (%) imports (%) employ. (%) wage rate (%) permit-price (ECU/ton C02) C02-reduction (%)
Belgium -0.16 0.35 -0.26 0.15 0.00 10.64 -10.00
Germany -0.07 -0.03 -0.35 0.05 0.00 19.97 -10.00
Denmark -0.12 0.05 -1.27 0.31 0.00 47.28 -10.00
France -0.09 0.05 -0.72 0.12 0.00 24.83 -10.00
Greece -0.34 -0.18 -0.69 -0.21 0.00 10.22 -10.00
Ireland -0.10 0.05 -0.44 0.22 0.00 19.19 -10.00
Italy -0.13 0.10 -1.37 0.32 0.00 35.99 -10.00
Netherlands -0.06 -0.27 -0.46 0.21 0.00 22.16 -10.00
Portugal -0.41 1.05 -0.68 1.09 0.00 23.65 -10.00
Spain -0.42 0.27 -1.01 0.43 0.00 20.56 -10.00
Great Britain 0.11 -1.37 -0.96 -0.29 0.00 31.12 -10.00
EU 0.01 -0.22 -1.01 0.12 25.10 -10.00
Rest of World -1.01 0.01
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Table 2: Purchase (+) and sales of permits (-) under a non-coordinated environmental policy
(in millions of ECU)
Belgium I Germany I Denmark T France I Greece I Ireland
agriculture 1.06 13.17 -2.89 9.63 2.09 1.17
coal -1.22 -8.01 0.00 -10.82 -0.11 -0.Q1
oil 3.39 20.36 1.36 17.61 0.48 0.06
gas 0.01 4.43 0.94 0.57 3.04 1.29
electricity -4.64 -178.45 -44.87 -120.76 -12.76 -2.49
energy intensive industries -44.10 -286.61 -10.91 -254.54 -9.26 -15.66
equipment goods industries 0.48 0.79 -0.73 -8.74 -0.06 -0.38
consumer goods industries 2.93 20.50 -5.62 9.13 1.71 -0.02
transport 3.33 29.82 5.75 34.54 2.95 0.90
services 8.01 30.55 0.10 19.00 1.82 0.33
non market services 0.86 12.73 -1.01 3.51 0.93 -0.47
households 29.88 340.71 57.88 300.85 9.18 15.26
net EU trade volume 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Italy I Netherlands I Portugal I Spain I Great Britain EU
agriculture 1.10 -0.83 -0.13 4.17 7.42 35.94
coal -14.19 0.00 -0.42 -1.67 -5.68 -42.12
oil 16.17 20.57 0.98 8.89 28.51 118.40
gas 0.07 0.76 0.00 0.12 19.95 31.17
electricity -73.64 -60.22 1.02 -36.50 -216.27 -749.58
energy intensive industries -305.71 -48.20 -10.20 -61.17 -147.66 -1194.02
equipment goods industries -5.30 -0.34 -0.15 -2.27 -22.66 -39.37
consumer goods industries 13.62 2.11 -0.96 5.32 -30.38 18.35
transport 45.39 9.40 2.27 23.03 51.56 208.96
services 12.07 0.76 0.19 6.32 12.84 91.99
non market services 0.26 -2.05 -0.18 0.78 -1.34 14.01
households 310.14 78.03 7.60 52.98 303.72 1506.22
net EU trade volume -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 Iruncalion error
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Table 3: The impact of tradable permits under a coordinated environmental policy
Scenario: 10 % EU-wide reduction of carbon dioxide
EV in Mill. of ECU EV in ECU per capita EV per GOP in % GOP(%) GOP deflator (%) production (%) priv. cons. (%)
Belgium -180 -18.29 -0.18 0.13 0.76 -0.14 -0.26
Germany -1735 -28.43 -0.24 -0.11 0.17 -0.27 -0.33
Denmark -174 -34.07 -0.27 0.06 0.06 -0.08 -0.41
France -1303 -23.68 -0.22 0.00 0.12 -0.15 -0.31
Greece -50 -5.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.49 -0.17 -0.08
Ireland -85 -24.09 -0.43 -0.01 0.54 -0.10 -0.57
Italy -946 _- -16.56 -0.18 0.06 0.13 -0.11 -0.27
Netherlands -374 -25.81 -0.25 0.01 -0.12 -0.13 -0.38
Portugal 14 1.42 0.06 0.43 1.45 -0.16 0.08
Spain -196 -5.07 -0.10 0.08 0.75 -0.23 -0.14
Great Britain -1461 -25.81 -0.28 -0.08 -1.05 -0.43 -0.39
EU -6491 -20.19 -0.21 -0.02 0.00 -0.23 -0.31
Rest of World
exports (%) invest. firms (%) imports (%) employ. (%) wage rate (%) permit-price (ECU/ton C02) C02-reduction (%)
Belgium -0.18 0.66 -0.41 0.39 0.00 23.06 -17.04
Germany -0.07 -0.03 -0.41 0.07 0.00 23.06 -11.20
Denmark -0.08 0.02 -0.71 0.16 0.00 23.06 -5.69
France -0.08 0.04 -0.69 0.11 0.00 23.06 -9.51
Greece -0.35 0.57 -0.37 0.31 0.00 23.06 -17.15
Ireland -0.11 0.05 -0.55 0.27 0.00 23.06 -11.55
Italy -0.11 0.06 -1.00 0.20 0.00 23.06 -7.32
Netherlands -0.06 -0.28 -0.48 0.23 0.00 23.06 -10.27
Portugal -0.40 1.02 -0.87 1.07 0.00 23.06 -9.83
Spain -0.43 0.32 -1.07 0.51 0.00 23.06 -10.95
Great Britain 0.04 -1.14 -0.80 -0.26 0.00 23.06 -7.89
EU 0.00 -0.16 -0.90 0.13 23.06 -10.00
Rest of World -0.90 0.00
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Table 4: Purchase (+) and sales of permits (-) under a coordinated environmental policy
(in millions of ECU)
Belgium I Germany I Denmark J France I Greece I Ireland
agriculture 0.11 11.25 1.06 9.90 1.44 1.05
coal -5.90 -11.48 0.00 -9.28 -0.49 -0.01
oil 6.72 22.35 1.06 16.61 I 0.93 0.07
gas 0.02 3.30 1.06 0.57 7.14 1.26
electricity -45.59 -278.44 -0.22 -102.92 -83.27 -4.46
energy intensive industries -222.27 -405.19 -0.68 -217.32 -47.41 -21.89
equipment goods industries -1.44 -5.58 0.40 -6.53 -0.52 -0.66
consumer goods industries 2.26 16.89 1.17 10.50 1.51 -1.89
transport 5.62 29.93 8.25 33.46 4.69 0.85
services 3.23 26.89 2.49 20.59 1.60 -0.04
non market services -1.92 8.27 1.38 5.24 0.54 -0.93
households 61.58 388.53 30.19 280.39 20.19 17.65
net EU trade volume -1§l7.59 -193.27 46.16 41.21 -93.64 -8.99
Italy J Netherlands I Portugal 1 Spain I Great Britain EU
agriculture 5.25 -1.52 -0.03 2.95 9.47 39.88
coal -6.34 0.00 -0.40 -2.17 -2.73 -38.80
oil 13.33 20.06 0.98 9.66 22.20 113.89
gas 0.10 0.77 0.00 0.13 36.66 49.76
electricity -0.47 -65.16 1.13 -54.90 -50.77 -680.62
energy intensive industries -114.93 -52.12 -9.58 -82.06 -69.03 -1220.59
equipment goods industries 2.47 -0.53 -0.13 -3.35 -8.17 -23.37
consumer goods industries 15.85 1.75 -0.80 3.60 -7.78 44.94
transport 42.17 9.51 2.28 23.37 46.30 205.58
services 32.45 0.28 0.30 4.12 25.69 117.63
non market services 8.56 -2.64 I -0.15 0.04 13.41 32.72
households 206.44 80.81 I 7.42 59.14 233.66 1368.36 I




Table 5: The impact of tradable permits under a unilateral action by Germany
Scenario: 10 % reduction of carbon dioxide in Germany
EV in Mill. of ECU EV in ECU per capita EV per GOP in % GOP(%) GOP deflator ("!o) production ("!o) priv. cons. (%)
Belgium 10 1.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Germany -1727 -28.30 -0.23 -0.09 0.09 -0.25 -0.33
Denmark 4 0.80 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
France 44 0.80 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Greece -3 -0.29 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Ireland 5 1.38 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Italy 4 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands -2 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0..02 0.00
Portugal 1 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.60 0.00
Spain 3 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Great Britain 33 0.58 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.01
EU -1628 -5.06 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.07
Rest of World
exports (%) invest. firms (%) imports (%) employ. ("!o) wage rate ("!o) permit-price (ECUlton C02) C02-reduction (%)
Belgium -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.35
Germany -0.02 -0.05 -0.40 0.05 0.00 19.45 -10.00
Denmark -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12
France 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.12
Greece -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.Q1
Ireland 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17
Italy -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Netherlands -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
Portugal -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Spain -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Great Britain -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06
EU 0.00 -0.04 -0.13 0.01 -2.74
Rest of World -0.13 0.00
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31Appendix 1: Construction ofthe Marginal Abatement Cost Function
In GEM-E3 we distinguish between thirteen emittants: agriculture, coal, oil, gas,
electric power, energy intensive industries, equipment goods industries, consumer
goods industries, transport, services, non-market services, heating systems of
households and private traffic. The available data
l concemin'g abatement measures for
S02 and NOx is usually collected under the criterias "type" and "size" of the com-
bustion systems. If we aggregate some GEM-E3 industries, we can keep the
consistency ofthe data and obtain 5 emission groups.
group ofemittants GEM-E3 industries
1 electric power
2 energy intensive industries, coal and equipment goods industries
3 oil (refineries)
4 consumer goods industries, gas, services, non-market services,
agriculture and heating systems ofthe households
5 transport and private traffic (households)
Using these cost functions for all countries, implies the following assumptions:
I) Availability ofthe considered abatement technology all over Europe.
2) The installation ofthis technology is feasible in all countries.
3) Equal installation costs for all countries.
There is no better country specific data available (in particular not for end-of-pipe
technologies). Therefore even more technical oriented models use these assumptions.
The impacts of abatement activities actually observed after 1985 are computed in a
reference run of the model by taking this emission reduction paths as an exogenous
input to the model.
For electric power generation, for instance, we constructed the following marginal
abatement cost functions in DM per kg ofabated emission.




c'(a) = 1.717·(1- a)-O.S92
c(a)=-4.208· (1- a)O.408 +5.7
c'(a)=2.775· (1- a)-1.294
c(a) = 9.439·(1- arO.294 -7.1
Figure 1 shows the marginal abatement cost functions for electric power generation.
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